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Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? In this paper we propose and analyze a particular
market failure that may lead to inefficiently low equilibrium fertility and therefore to a need for government
intervention. The friction we investigate is related to the ownership of children. If parents have no
claim on their children’s income, then the private benefit from producing a child may be smaller than
the social benefit. We present an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with fertility choice and altruism,
and model ownership by introducing a minimum constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using
the efficiency concepts proposed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), we find that whenever the
transfer floor is binding, fertility choices are inefficient. We show how this inefficiency relates to dynamic
inefficiency in standard OLG models with exogenous fertility and Millian efficiency in models with
endogenous fertility. In particular, we show that the usual conditions for efficiency are no longer sufficient.
Further, we analyze several government policies in this context. We find that, in contrast to settings
with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to implement the efficient
allocation. To achieve the efficient outcome, government transfers need to be tied to a person’s fertility
choice in order to provide incentives for child-bearing.
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In many European countries current birth rates are well below replacement levels, e.g.,
as low as 1.4 in Germany or 1.3 in Italy. Governments in those countries seem con-
cerned, and are discussing, several pronatalist policies.1 To some extent, these policies
have already been implemented in various countries. For example, French parents re-
ceive generous subsidies for each child. Recently, the German government announced
that it plans to triple the number of subsidized day care spots. Some Italian villages
have experimented with generous one-time payments for the birth of a child.2 Is there
an economic rationale for such policies?
In this paper we explore one particular market failure that may give rise to sub-
optimal fertility choice. The friction we investigate is related to ownership over chil-
dren. The basic observation is that children are a resource for society. For example they
increase the total labor endowment in the future. Property rights over this endowment
may affect incentives. In particular, if labor income belongs to children rather than
parents, then the private beneﬁt of producing children may be smaller than the social
beneﬁt. The reason is that private beneﬁts include only the utility from children, while
the social beneﬁts also include an increase in the aggregate time endowment. Due to
this discrepancy, equilibrium fertility may be lower than what is socially optimal or ef-
ﬁcient.3 Even though in the formal model we focus on property rights over the labor
endowment, our conclusions are more generally true. For example, if parents and chil-
dren disagree about other aspects of a child’s life, then who owns the right to make
decisions will affect fertility choices and efﬁciency.
We believe that ownership of children is a relevant concept to analyze because it
varies substantially across countries and has changed dramatically over time in most
of the developed world. Most interesting in this context are mandatory parental sup-
port or ﬁlial responsibility laws which used to make adult children legally responsible
for their elderly parents. Over the course of the last two centuries, most developed
countries have experienced a shift from a regime where parents had almost perfect
1See for example “Europe, East and West, wrestles with falling birthrates—Long decline threatening
economy,” International Herald Tribune (September 3, 2006) and “Europe: The fertility bust, Charle-
magne” The Economist, February 11, 2006.
2See “European nations offer incentives to have kids”, San Francisco Chronicle, Elizabeth Bryant,
August10, 2008; “GermanParentstoGetMoreDaycareOptions”, DeutscheWelle, April3, 2007. “Where
have all the bambini gone?”, Telegraph, April 18, 2004.
3Other inefﬁciencies relating to fertility are addressed in Pitchford (1985), Nerlove, Razin, and Sadka
(1985, Oct., 1986), Lee and Miller (1990), Bruce and Waldman (1990), Harford (1998), Zhang and Zhang
(2007). These concentrate on strategic considerations and a variety of externalities such as pollution.
1control over their offsprings’ income to a regime where children have no formal oblig-
ation towards their parents. In this paper we investigate to what extent such laws
matter. Do such laws affect the fertility decision, and how do such effects potentially
affect normative analysis?
Theformalmodelweusetoanalyzetheimportanceofchildownershipisaninﬁnite
horizon overlapping-generations (OLG) model with fertility choice and altruism. We
formalize the idea by introducing a constraint that sets a minimal transfer from parents
to children, as a fraction of a child’s income. This formulation allows us to cover the
full range of property rights, from parents fully owning children’s labor income to a
situation where children have a legal claim on their parent’s income.
Analyzing normative questions in models with endogenous fertility requires tak-
ing a stand on the appropriate concept of efﬁciency. The reason is that Pareto efﬁciency
is not well-deﬁned when considering allocations with different population sizes. Of
course, one can ask whether holding population size constant a Pareto-dominating
allocation exists. However, such analysis yields no answer to the question whether
equilibrium fertility might be inefﬁciently low. We therefore use an alternative con-
cept, A-efﬁciency, ﬁrst proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), which is very
close to Pareto efﬁciency but allows allocations with different population sizes to be
compared.4 In the context of models without altruism, some authors have used an
alternative concept, M-efﬁciency, which applies only to symmetric allocations. We fo-
cus mostly on A-efﬁciency, since, analogous to Pareto efﬁciency, it allows people to be
treated asymmetrically when constructing dominating allocations. Therefore, the set
of (symmetric) A-efﬁcient allocations is a subset of the set of M-efﬁcient allocations.
Appendix A.1 gives formal deﬁnitions of the concepts used here.
We ﬁnd that whether or not the minimal transfer constraint is binding in equilib-
rium depends on parameters such as the degree of altruism and the production func-
tion. Whenever the constraint is binding, fertility is inefﬁciently low. The ﬁnding that
equilibrium fertility may be inefﬁciently low when property rights rest with children is
interesting, because it seems to violate Coase’s theorem. We argue that this inefﬁciency
is caused by the non-existence of a market in which parents and unborn children can
make trades. Such a market can never exist due to the inter-temporal nature of fertility.
Ifparentshavepropertyrightsovertheirchildren’slaborincome, thecostsandbeneﬁts
ofproducingnewpeoplearealignedandequilibriaaregenerallyefﬁcient. Ontheother
4All our results also go through for a second concept proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007),
P-efﬁciency, as long as one assigns a low enough utility to unborn people.
2hand, if property rights are allocated to the children themselves, costs and beneﬁts are
borne by different people and inefﬁciency may result. Because children who are not
born yet cannot negotiate and promise compensation, the original Coasian argument
breaks down and the assignment of property rights becomes important for efﬁciency.
In standard OLG models with exogenous fertility, a necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tionfordynamicefﬁciencyisthattheinterestrateisgreaterthanthepopulationgrowth
rate (Cass (1972) and Balasko and Shell (1980)). We show that when ownership is allo-
cated to parents (i.e., the transfer constraint is low enough), dynamic inefﬁciency can
never occur. In this case, in line with standard results, the interest rate is bigger than
the population growth rate. At the other extreme, when the minimum transfer is large
enough, equilibria are dynamically inefﬁcient in the usual sense. As in the standard
case, this inefﬁciency is characterized by an interest rate that is below the population
growth rate and a dominating allocation involves the standard transfer scheme with-
out the need to change population. However, we show that, for intermediate values
of the transfer constraint, the interest rate is above the population growth rate but the
allocation is still inefﬁcient. In this case, a dominating allocation always requires an
increase in fertility. Thus, in contrast to standard OLG models, an interest rate above
the population growth rate is no longer a sufﬁcient condition for efﬁciency. The reason
is that in addition to the potential for over-saving, when fertility is endogenous there
is also a potential for under-fertility.
Another class of related models are OLG models with endogenous fertility and no
altruism(e.g., Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, andP´ erez-Nievas(2010)andMichelandWigniolle
(2007)). A main ﬁnding in this literature is that a sufﬁcient condition for M-efﬁciency
is that the cost of a child is higher than the present discounted value of the child’s
wage. We show that, while necessary, this condition is not sufﬁcient for efﬁciency in
our context. That is, transfer constraints may be binding in a region where the above
inequality holds. In this region, it is possible to ﬁnd an allocation with higher fertility
that dominates the original allocation.
The existing literature has emphasized the importance of altruism for the efﬁciency
properties of OLG models.5 In particular, adding altruism to the standard OLG model,
Barro (1974) shows that operative intergenerational transfers are a necessary and suf-
ﬁcient condition for efﬁciency. Burbidge (1983) argues that when altruism is added
properly, intergenerational transfers will always be operative and the interest rate is
always larger than the population growth rate, so that the potential for dynamic inef-
5See, for example, Chapter 6 in Cigno and Werding (2007).
3ﬁciencies disappears. On the other hand, Pazner and Razin (1980) show that, adding
fertility choice to this model, bequests are always zero, yet the allocation is still efﬁ-
cient.6 Further, in a model with fertility choice but non-altruistic parents, Conde-Ruiz,
Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) and Michel and Wigniolle (2007) show that an inter-
est rate higher than the population growth rate is not a sufﬁcient condition for (Millian)
efﬁciency. We show in our set-up that it is not the presence or absence of altruism that
leads to these differing results. Rather, the implicit assumptions on property rights
are key to understanding the variety of ﬁndings. While property rights assumptions
are typically not discussed explicitly, any model makes an implicit assumption about
ownership. Analyzing this assumption elucidates previous ﬁndings.
Finally, we analyze the effects of various policies. We show that, if property rights
lie with children and parents are therefore constrained, a PAYG pension system relaxes
the transfer constraint. However, even if the pension system is such that parents are
not constrained, the resulting equilibrium is not efﬁcient.7 The reason is that individual
parents do not take into account that they are producing future contributors to the pen-
sion system. Therefore, the costs and beneﬁts of having children are not aligned. Thus,
even if taxes are lump-sum to children, they are distortionary to the fertility decision of
parents. A natural way around the distortion introduced by a PAYG pension system is
tomake pensions afunction of individual fertility choices. In fact, we show that a fertil-
ity dependent PAYG system can be used to implement an efﬁcient allocation, which is
the equilibrium allocation when parents have full property rights. This result is in line
with those in Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot (2004), Lang (2005)
and Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) who use models without altruism
and different efﬁciency/optimality concepts, but do not relate their result to the alloca-
tion of property rights. Further, we show that the same allocation can be implemented
through an alternative system that subsidizes births and ﬁnances the subsidy through
government debt.8
The idea that parents may not have access to a child’s future labor income has been
explored in several other contexts. In particular, several models with exogenous fertil-
ity look at the importance of this margin for education decisions. What we call prop-
erty rights assigned to the child, is typically called “borrowing constraints” or “in-
complete markets” in this literature. For example, Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri
6Intratemporal transfers between generations, not explicitly modeled, may be non-zero however.
7Sinn (2004) analyzes PAYG as fertility insurance.
8For related optimal fertility policies in different setups, see Cigno (1983, 1986, 1992).
4(2002) analyze the implications of borrowing constraints for the efﬁciency of invest-
ments in children in a model where fertility is exogenous. Similarly, Fern´ andez and
Rogerson (2001) analyze the implications of borrowing constraints for child schooling
decisions and long-run inequality in a set-up with exogenous (but stochastic) fertility.9
Also, Boldrin and Montes (2005) analyze a model where young adults make their own
schooling decisions but are borrowing-constrained leading to an inefﬁciently low level
of schooling. There is an important distinction, however, between the inefﬁciency in
education and fertility choices. The cost and beneﬁts of investing in human capital
could, in principle, be borne by the same person. For example, if children made their
own education investment decisions and markets are complete, then no friction exists.
The same is not possible in the context of fertility decisions. It is simply not tech-
nologically feasible for a child to bear the costs of producing herself. Of course, one
can design institutions that move the cost to the next generation (such as the fertility-
dependent social security system we discuss in this paper), but such arrangements will
always involve government intervention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy dis-
cusses the existence of laws that affect ownership over children. Section 3 presents
the model, characterizes equilibria and derives comparative statics. In Section 4 we
analyze the efﬁciency properties of equilibrium fertility. Section 5 explores several
government policies and Section 6 concludes.
2 Property Rights and Control over Children’s Income
The argument of this paper is that the allocation of property rights over a child’s in-
come has important economic consequences. In reality these property rights differ
dramatically across countries and across time. In this section, we brieﬂy describe some
of the relevant laws. We discuss evidence from both the common law system of the
United States and England and with the Roman-based legal system in France.
From the perspective of our theory, we are most interested in parental control over
an offspring’s life-time labor income. We therefore ﬁrst discuss laws that directly af-
fect access to an offspring’s labor income, such as mandatory parental support or ﬁlial
responsibility laws. Laws about child labor are also relevant as they allow (or prevent)
access to part of an offspring’s life-time labor income. Second, we discuss laws that
9See also Lazear (1983).
5give parents control over other aspects of their children’s lives, and thereby might al-
low parents to control their offsprings’ income indirectly, e.g., by withdrawing consent
to marriage unless monetary support is given. Third, de-facto control may vary with
other aspects of society, such as living arrangements that affect the ability to moni-
tor offsprings.
The (Elizabethan) Poor Law Act of 1601 obligated (adult) children to support their
parents both in England and the U. S. (Callahan, 1985; Kline, 1992). Parents gradually
lost this beneﬁt in the mid 19th and early 20th centuries, as England and the U. S.
began to repeal or ignore laws that obligated children to support their elderly parents
(Thomson, 1984; Britton, 1990). Article 205 of the Napoleonic Civil code in France
also speciﬁed that children had to support their elderly parents in cases of need (Byrd,
1988). This law became obsolete after the establishment of a formal social security
system in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Legal indenture of children as servants
was allowed in the U.S. throughout the 18th century (Marks, 1975). From the early
19th century, parents lost their right to indenture their children in many states, laws
prohibiting children from leaving the family were “either repealed or ignored,” and
parents were obligated by law to provide proper care for their children (Marks, 1975).
Before the introduction of child labor and mandatory education laws, parents typ-
ically had access to their minor children’s income.10 However, by 1938, every U.S.
state had passed laws which effectively banned child labor and enforced compulsory
schooling (Landes and Solmon, 1972; Margolin, 1978; Guggenheim, 2005). Another
important factor in a determining a parent’s access to his child’s resources is the legal
deﬁnition of adulthood. In the 1970s, reforms were passed in the U.S. that reduced
the age of majority from 21 to 18 (Castle, 1986). Around the same time, setting out the
conditions under which children were released from parental authority and deemed
“adults” for important legal purposes. These included rules for allowing a (minor)
child to earn and spend his/her own wages (Plotkin, 1981; Davis, 2006).
Alongside the laws that directly affected parent’s access over labor income, histor-
ically many laws have existed that allowed parents to control other aspects of their
offsprings’ lives. This control gave parents a lot of leverage over their children’s re-
sources. The most extreme example of parental control over children in the U. S. was
a set of stubborn child laws implemented in several states during the mid-17th century,
10Kertzer and Barbagli (2001) point out that “for many poor parents among the working class, the
artisans and the peasantry, the regular school attendance of their children implied enforced withdrawal
from work, whether at home or in the workshop” which eliminated a form of income for parents.
6which obligated children to be obedient to their parents. If children failed to comply,
parents had the right to take their children to court, and offenses could be punished by
death. Corporal punishment and physical cruelty were also common methods parents
used to enforce discipline (Mason, 1994). Finally, parental consent was often necessary
for marriage (Kertzer and Barbagli, 2001). In contrast, there was little that children
could do to protect themselves from their parents. For example a 1641 law made it
illegal to curse or hit one’s parents. A child who broke this law (and was over 16 years
of age) could be punished by death (Hawes, 1991).
Similar degrees of parental control were also present in Roman-based legal systems
(Arjava, 1998). In France, the concept of patria potestad, the control which a father exer-
cised over this children, underlined all legal decisions regarding children.11 The legal
system also allowed parents to use lettres de cachet12 to enforce their authority when
their child refused to follow parental direction regarding a marriage partner or career
(Kertzer and Barbagli, 2001).
After the mid-19th century, the U. S. passed numerous laws that reduced the con-
trol of parents over their children, including strict laws on abuse, cruelty and parental
neglect (Marks, 1975). Agencies, such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren, were created to protect children from parental cruelty (Hawes, 1991). Finally,
in the 1970s, reforms were passed that expanded medical rights for minor children
(Plotkin, 1981) and greatly expanded abuse protection, such as the 1973 Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (Hawes, 1991; Guggenheim, 2005). In short, by the end
of the 20th century, children in the U.S. had gained rights that essentially allocated all
property rights to the children themselves. Similar reforms also took place in France:
“neglected children came under the protection of the courts (1889), children were pro-
tected from the physical abuse of their parents by criminal statute (1898) and 21 was
established as the age of majority when children were allowed to undertake legal acts
and marry without parental consent (1907)” (Kertzer 2001, p. 141).13
Besides these legal changes, de facto parental control over children may also have
changed due to technological progress. In particular, the process of industrialization
was accompanied by changing living arrangements from extended to nuclear families,
11Patria Potestad is “a control similar to that over material things and one which permitted a father to
sell or pawn a child if necessary and even to eat it in an extreme case” (Sponsler 1982, p. 147-148).
12Letters signed by the king often used to enforce authority and sentence someone without trial.
13In legal terms, by 1972, “the relationship of parent to child [was] no longer viewed as a power of
domination” and instead was “seen as an authority conferred upon parents to protect the child, thus
entailing responsibilities as well as rights”(Alexandre 1972, p. 652-653).
7which likely lowered the de facto control parents have over their children.14 Parental
control is much easier to exercise in a setting where multiple generations live together
in the same household, compared to a setting where young couples live away from
their parents (Folbre, 1994). Thus, the reality of living arrangements may determine
de-facto property rights over children’s income.
In sum, changes in ﬁlial responsibility laws, other parental control rights, and de-
facto control all paint the same picture. Historically parents, and in most cases the
father, were in a position of almost absolute control over their offsprings. Starting from
the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, many different types of reforms were passed that
removed most of the legal and de-facto control of parents, and essentially led offspring
to gain ownership over their own earnings and their life more generally.
3 Dynastic Overlapping Generations Model with
Fertility Choice
We now set up our model, and show that ownership over children matters for equi-
librium fertility choices. We show this in a model where parents view children as
consumption goods and are altruistic towards them. The model we use is a special
case of dynastic endogenous fertility models ﬁrst developed in Razin and Ben-Zion
(1975). With logarithmic utility, it is also a special case of Becker and Barro (1986, 1988)
and Barro and Becker (1989), though extended to two-period overlapping lives. In
contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly introduce ownership over children into
the model. Speciﬁcally, in the model we focus on property rights over adult children’s
labor income.
First, we characterize equilibria in general. Second, we solve the model for the
special case of logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production. We then derive com-
parative statics with respect to property rights and ﬁnd the ﬁrst order effect of a shift
in property rights from parents to children is a decrease of fertility. In the next section
we derive efﬁciency results and compare them to those in other OLG models.
14In the U. S., in the mid-19th century, almost 70 percent of persons age 65 or older resided with their
adult children, while by the end of the 20th century, fewer than 15 percent did. While many scholars
have attributed the change in living arrangements to increased resources of the old, Ruggles (2007)
argues that increased opportunities of the young played a major role.
83.1 Model Setup
People in our model live for three periods: childhood, (middle-aged) adulthood and
retirement. In childhood, no decisions are made. Middle-aged adults work and bear
children. Retired people live off their savings and potentially transfers from their chil-
dren.15 Households derive utility from their own consumption when middle-aged, cm
t ,
and when old, co
t+1, the number of children, nt, as well as their offsprings’ average util-
ity. That is, in our model children are a consumption good in that nt directly enters
the utility function, but parents are also altruistic and care about their children’s utility.
The advantage of this formulation is that both models with altruism as well as models
without endogenous fertility can be seen as special cases of our set-up, by setting ³ and
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where nt is the number of children in period t. We assume that u(¢) is continuous,
strictly increasing, strictly concave and u0(0) = 1. Discounting between periods is






















where st+1 are savings, bi
t+1wt+1 is the transfer from parent to child i if positive, from
child i to the parent if negative, and µt is the cost per child.16
The minimum constraint, bt+1, can be interpreted as parental property rights over
children’s labor income.17 When bt+1 is positive, then a larger transfer ﬂoor implies
15We introduce government transfers in Section 5.
16For example, µt = a
g
t + (ac
t ¡ ·t)wt with a
g
t the goods cost of children, ac
t is the fraction of time that
has to be spent with every child in raising it and ·t is the amount of (effective) labor the parent can
extract from the child. For example, if a period is 20 years and children can work from age 10 and are
half as productive as an adult, then ·t ¼ 0:25. Below we concentrate on parents’ property rights over
adult children but a change in ·t could reﬂect changes in child-labor laws, for example.
17Specifying transfers as absolute amounts rather than proportional to the wage leads to the same
qualitative results. This is because, though chosen by the parent, both types of transfers are lump-sum
9that parents have to bequeath more resources to their children. When bt+1 is nega-
tive, a higher transfer ﬂoor means parents can expropriate fewer resources from their
children. The transfer ﬂoor is only well-deﬁned between -1 and some bmax. When
bt+1 = ¡1 then there are no (legal or effective) constraints on transfers and parents
have full property rights over their children’s income. If, on the other hand, bt+1 = 0
then children own their own income. If bt+1 > 0 then children have a claim to their par-
ent’s income. The maximum possible transfer, b
max
t+1 , is an endogenous object. At b
max
t+1 a
parent would bequeath his entire income to his children. A closed form expression for
bmax as a function of parameters is derived for speciﬁc functional forms below.
Initially, there is a mass 1 of initial old people each endowed with K0 capital and
















0w0di · r0K0; b
i
0 ¸ b0






Ut in equation (1) subject to the constraints in (2), given bt; the transfer from his own
parentsandprices(wt;wt+1;rt+1), takingthebehaviorofalldescendantsasgiven. Since
we assume that the utility function satisﬁes Inada conditions, the non-negativity con-
straints on fertility and consumption never bind, while the minimum constraint on
transfers, bt+1, may or may not bind. A few additional assumptions are required to
ensure that the problem is well-deﬁned. First, we need a joint restriction on ° and ³ to
rule out that the limit where n ! 0 and per child consumption goes to inﬁnity yielding




ensure that this cannot happen.18 Another requirement for the problem to be well-
deﬁned is that the budget for the unconstrained dynastic head is not inﬁnite. This
requires that the cost of producing a child is at least as high as the (discounted) life-
time earnings per child: µt >
wt+1
rt+1 . Without this requirement an unconstrained parent
to the child since labor supply in perfectly inelastic.
18This is equivalent to the parameter restrictions needed in standard Barro-Becker models, in the
special case of separable (logarithmic) utility. See Appendix A.2 for details.
10could ﬁnance inﬁnite consumption by borrowing through his children. As we show
in Section 4, this condition always holds in any unconstrained steady state. Finally, to
guarantee ﬁnite utility we assume
³ < 1: (4)
The representative ﬁrm has a neo-classical production function Yt = F(Kt;Lt), and
takes prices (rt;wt) as given when choosing (Kt;Lt) to maximize proﬁts. For simplic-
ity, we assume full depreciation throughout. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production
function for the special case below.
Finally, markets clear. Labor markets clear in period t if the ﬁrm’s labor demand
per old person, Lt, is equal to the number of middle-aged people per old person, nt¡1,
since they are the only ones who are productive and labor is supplied inelastically. The
capital stock per old person, Kt, must be equal to savings from currently old people,
st. Denoting kt as the capital stock per worker, we can write st = ktnt¡1. Hence, factor
markets clear if Lt = nt¡1 and Kt = st = ktnt¡1: Goods market clearing in period t can





t + µtnt + st+1) = F(st;nt¡1) = nt¡1F(kt;1):
3.2 Characterizing equilibria
If u(:) is strictly concave and there is no heterogeneity among children, it is always best
for the parent to give the same transfer to each child, bi
t+1 = bt+1;8i. Hence, we can
rewrite the utility as:
Ut = u(c
m
t ) + ¯u(c
o
t+1) + °u(nt) + ³Ut+1
and the budget constraint when old as:
c
o
t+1 + ntbt+1wt+1 · rt+1st+1
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Thus, the problem can be interpreted as either the middle-aged adult in period
s choosing (cm
s ;co
s+1;ns;ss+1;bs+1) to maximize Us in equation (5) subject to the con-
straints in (2) for t = s or, the initial old (i.e., the “Planner”) making all decisions




























t + µtnt + st+1 = wt(1 + bt) (10)
c
o
t+1 + ntbt+1wt+1 = rt+1st+1 (11)
¸b;t+1(bt+1 ¡ bt+1) = 0: (12)
Note that, without heterogeneity other than period of birth, savings will always be
positive as long as the production function satisﬁes Inada conditions.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm’s problem are given by:
wt = FL(kt;1) (13)
rt = FK(kt;1) (14)
Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions with the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem, we
now derive four equations that characterize the equilibrium allocation. The ﬁrst two
equations are intertemporal conditions equating marginal costs and beneﬁts of invest-
ment in physical capital and children. The third condition is an intratemporal but in-
tergenerational condition, equating the parent’s marginal cost and beneﬁt of an ad-
ditional unit of transfer per child, bt+1, unless the minimum constraint is binding.
The fourth equation relates the equilibrium capital stock to the (binding) transfer con-








12This is a standard Euler condition. On the left-hand side (LHS) we have the marginal
cost of saving one more unit when young, while on the right-hand side (RHS) we have
the marginal beneﬁt of saving for consumption when old.





t+1)[µtFK(kt+1;1) + bt+1FN(kt+1;1)]: (16)
This equation equates the marginal costs and beneﬁts from children. The marginal
beneﬁt from another child is simply °u0(nt). The marginal cost consists of the forgone
consumption due to the cost of producing the child, µ, and the bequest or transfer
a parent wants to make to a child, bt+1FN(kt+1;1). Note that the transfer might be
negative, in which case the cost is lower than the child-bearing cost. Note also that
since the child-bearing cost and the transfer occur in different periods, the interest rate
also enters the expression.











t+1) if ¸b;t+1 > 0 :
Recall that ¸b;t+1 is the multiplier on the transfer constraint. So when the constraint is
binding, the marginal utility of consumption when old is “too high”, while the mar-
ginal utility of children’s consumption is “too low” from the parent’s point of view.
That is, consumption of the old is too low compared to their children’s consumption
when middle aged. This wedge is at the heart of the inefﬁciency.
Note that a model without altruism is a special case of our model, namely when
³ = 0. However, without altruism, parents always take everything they legally can
from children. That is, the minimum transfer constraint is always binding so that bt+1 =
bt+1.19 On the other hand, if ³ > 0 and utility, u(¢), satisﬁes Inada conditions, then the
parent will choose bt+1 > ¡1 and hence the minimal transfer constraint, bt+1 ¸ b,
is not necessarily binding. For most parts of the paper we focus on the case where
³ > 0, as this is the more interesting case that allows for both binding and non-binding
19Note that ³ = 0 and b = 0 are implicit assumptions in Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu,
and Patxot (2004), Lang (2005), Michel and Wigniolle (2007, forthcoming) and Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez,
and P´ erez-Nievas (2010). We compare our results to theirs below.
13constraints.20








t=0 and prices by fw¤
t;r¤
tg1
t=0. We denote any equilibrium al-
locationforthecasewheresomegenerationisconstrainedbyf^ cm
t ;^ co
t+1; ^ nt; ^ st+1;^ kt;^ bt+1g1
t=0
and prices by f ^ wt; ^ rtg1
t=0.
Finally, we derive an equation that characterizes the equilibrium capital stock when
parents are transfer constrained. Using equation (16) and capital market clearing in the








Note that the only endogenous variable in this equation is ks+1. Also note that this
equation does not depend on bs; it only depends on bs+1 and µs. For given bs+1 and µs,
the capital-labor ratio, ^ ks+1, can be found as a solution to equation (18).
The state variable in this economy is the capital-labor ratio, Kt+1=nt. Since capital
depreciates fully across generations, parents are free to choose the capital labor ratio
optimally, given their constraints. Therefore, if both bt and µt are constant, then the
economy is in steady state as of period 1, i.e., there are no transitional dynamics.
3.3 Analytical example
Next we explicitly derive a closed form solution for the special case of logarithmic





First, suppose bt = ¡1 for all t. Then altruism implies that no generation is con-
20It is well known that in the standard closed economy growth model with parental altruism and fer-
tility choice, such as the model analyzed in Barro and Becker (1989), bequests are always positive, and
hence, any minimum bequest constraint less than or equal to zero, b · 0, will never be binding. How-
ever, in our set-up, parents overlap with productive children and therefore desired bequests/transfers
may well be negative. The difference is that when generations truly overlap, a negative bequest is per-
fectly consistent with a positive capital stock, which is not the case when each generation lives only
for one period. Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Pazner and Razin (1980) allow for one period overlap in
adult/productive lives. However, they implicitly assume that bt = ¡1 for all t throughout their analysis.
14strained. Inthiscase, thesteadystatecapital-laborratio, fertilityandtransfersaregivenby:
k
¤ =
®µ(¯ + ³(1 + ¯ + °))





¯(1 ¡ ®) + ° ¡ ®³ (1 + ° + ¯)





[³µ®(1 + ¯ + °) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)k¤°]
k¤(1 ¡ ®)(° ¡ ³ (1 + ° + ¯))
(21)
Our parameter restriction (3) guarantees that all variables are strictly positive in equi-
librium. Notethattheoptimaltransfermaywellbenegative. Weﬁndthatb¤ isnegative
if and only if
¯(1 ¡ ®) > ®³ (1 + ° + ¯): (22)
To see this, note that b¤ is negative if and only if
µ®³(1 + ¯ + °) < (1 ¡ ®)k
¤°:
Using equation (19) and rearranging yields condition (22). The condition is compatible
with our parameter restriction (3) as long as ³ <
¯
®+¯, i.e., as long as parents are not
too altruistic.
Condition (22) shows that parents want to take resources from children if the labor
share in output is sufﬁciently high and if parents value their children’s utility little
enough relative to their own old age consumption. This shows that even altruistic
parents want to take resources away from their children under certain circumstances.
It also suggests that children are not only a consumption good in this model, but also
an investment good.
Second, consider b such that b¤ < b. In this case, the parent chooses ^ b = b and the
steady state capital-labor ratio and fertility are given by:
^ k =
®¯µ
®° ¡ (¯ + °)(1 ¡ ®)b
(23)
^ n =
°A®(1 ¡ ®)^ k®(1 + b)
(1 + ¯ + °)
³
®µ + b(1 ¡ ®)^ k
´ (24)
For efﬁciency results in Section 4, it is useful to deﬁne the following two thresholds.
15Let bP be the transfer constraint such that ^ n = ^ r and let bM be the transfer constraint
such that ^ w = µ^ r. Using the equations above, we can derive closed form solutions for
bP and bM:
bP =
®(1 + 2¯ + °) ¡ ¯
(1 ¡ ®)(1 + 2¯ + °)
(25)
bM =
°® ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ ®)(¯ + °)
(26)




(1¡®)(¯+°). It is straightforward to see that bP < b
max if and only if
(1 + 2¯ + °)® < 1. Since this conditions does not contradict the parameter restrictions
needed for the model to be well deﬁned—conditions (3) and (4)— a low enough ®
is sufﬁcient to guarantee the existence of bP. Clearly, bM < b
max is always true for
admissible parameters.
3.4 Changes in property rights and fertility choice
Here we analyze how a permanent shift in property rights (from parents to children)
affects fertility choice. A tightening of the transfer constraint, if binding, means that
children are more costly, so that the ﬁrst order effect is a decline in fertility. However,
several indirect effects are present and complicate the analysis. Except for those who
are old when the law is changed, a tightening of the transfer constraint affects people
in two ways. First, they receive less from their own children, but they also owe less
to their own parents. The latter is an income effect which may lead to higher desired
fertility. Second, general equilibrium effects are present as the tightening of the transfer
constraint affects the capital labor ratio, thus changing relative prices, which in turn
changes the incentive to invest in children vs. capital. Note that the exact timing of
the legal change matters. A change in the constraint starting from period s + 1 that
is announced in s has different effects than does a surprise change in s + 1. We now
disentangle these direct and indirect effects more formally.
Assume the economy is in a steady state where the constraint is constant and bind-
ing at b. In period s, there is an (unanticipated) permanent shift in property rights from
parents to children so that b
0 > b in all future periods. We assume that this change in
the law takes place after transfers of generation s to their own parents have taken place,
but before any other decisions are made. In other words, bs = b while bt = b
0 > b for all
16t > s. Therefore, the change in the law affects generation s differently from generations
born later. With this thought experiment in mind, we use marginal arguments below
to simplify the algebra. For this analysis, it is useful to derive the general expression
for equilibrium fertility (i.e., the non-steady state analog of (24)). For the logarithmic
utility case, the expression is
nt =
°








First, consider generation s. Note that bs is unchanged by assumption and that ws is
only a function of the capital-labor ratio which was chosen in the previous period and
is therefore unaffected by the legal change. Therefore, the change in fertility is entirely
determined by the change in the ratio
bs+1ws+1





















Therefore, to determine the effect of the legal change on ns we only need to deter-
mine the change in the capital-labor ratio in period s + 1. The sign of
dks+1
dbs+1 is positive
as long as capital and labor are substitutable enough (see Appendix A.3 for details).
For example, this is the case with a Cobb-Douglas production function. It follows from
(29) that the fertility effect on generation s is unambiguously negative for this case. To
sum up, for generation s, the effective cost of children, (µs + bs+1ws+1=rs+1), increases
in bs+1 as long as labor and capital are substitutable enough because this guarantees an
increase in ws+1=rs+1.
Second, the effects on later generations are more complicated. Taking into account
the relationship between
bt+1wt+1
rt+1 and kt+1 as described above, we can write equilibrium
fertility for any generation t > s as
nt =
¯ + °






































Comparing equation (31) to (29) we see that for generations beyond s there are two
additional terms—both dampening the fertility decline. The ﬁrst term comes from the
fact that these later generations owe their own parents less, which is a positive income
effect, leading to higher fertility. The second term is a general equilibrium effect. Their
own wage rate increases in response to the change in b (because of the increase in the
capital stock) which generates a further positive income effect.
The overall effect of the change in property rights on fertility for generations t > s
may therefore be positive or negative. However, in most examples, there is a range of
large b where an increase in b causes fertility to fall, i.e., the total derivative is negative.
4 Property Rights and Efﬁciency
In this section we analyze the efﬁciency properties of equilibria in our model. Analyz-
ing normative questions in models with endogenous fertility requires taking a stand
on the appropriate concept of efﬁciency. The problem is that Pareto efﬁciency is not
a well-deﬁned concept when considering allocations with different population sizes.
One might still ask whether a given allocation is Pareto efﬁcient, i.e., whether for a
given population a dominating allocation exists. However, this kind of analysis can-
not address the question whether equilibrium fertility is too low. We use an alternative
concept, A-efﬁciency, ﬁrst proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), which is very
close to Pareto efﬁciency but allows us to compare allocations with different popula-
tion sizes.21 In the context of models without altruism, some authors have used an
alternative concept, Millian efﬁciency (M-efﬁciency), which requires potentially dom-
inating allocations to be symmetric across all people within a given generation. Note
that the set of (symmetric) A-efﬁcient allocations is a subset of the set of M-efﬁcient
allocations. In other words, by widening the set of potentially dominating allocations,
we can identify inefﬁciencies that cannot be addressed if symmetry is imposed. Ap-
21All our results also go through for a second concept proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007),
P-efﬁciency, as long as one assigns a low enough utility to unborn people.
18pendix A.1 gives formal deﬁnitions of all concepts.
Using these concepts, we compare our ﬁndings to the previous literature on efﬁ-
ciency in OLG models. We ﬁrst state two basic results that characterize when equi-
libria are efﬁcient. The analysis thereafter includes both a comparison with dynamic
efﬁciency in standard OLG models and one with M-efﬁciency in OLG models with
endogenous fertility but no altruism. We show how previous results about dynamic
and M-efﬁciency depend on whether the transfer constraint is binding or not. We also
show that sufﬁcient conditions for efﬁciency derived in the literature no longer apply
when considering A-efﬁciency in a model with altruism.
4.1 A- and P-efﬁciency of competitive equilibrium allocations
Our ﬁrst result states that equilibria in an economy without transfer constraints are
always A-efﬁcient.








t=0, is A- (and P-) efﬁcient.
Proof. ThisfollowsfromTheorem2inGolosov, Jones, andTertilt(2007). Withouttrans-
fer constraints, the equilibrium allocation maximizes the utility of the dynastic head,
given prices. Thus, the equilibrium allocation is dynastically A- (and P-) efﬁcient.
This, together with the assumption of a neoclassical production function, ensures that
the assumptions of Theorem 2 in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) are satisﬁed.
On the other hand, when there are binding constraints, then the equilibrium allo-
cation is always A-inefﬁcient, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 2 Assume ³ > 0. If ¸b;s+1 > 0 for some generation s, then the equilibrium
allocation, f^ cm
t ;^ co
t+1; ^ nt; ^ st+1;^ kt;^ bt+1g1
t=0, is A- (and P-) inefﬁcient.
Proof. We prove this by constructing an alternative allocation that A-dominates the
equilibrium. The alternative allocation has an " > 0 amount of additional children for
each member of generation s. Each new child transfers an additional ± > 0 resources
to her parent. This new allocation is feasible and for small " and ±, this new alloca-
tion makes generation s strictly better off, and no one worse off. See Appendix A.4
for a formal proof.
19Itisworthnotingthattheunconstrainedequilibriumallocation, thoughA¡efﬁcient,
is not necessarily A¡superior to the equilibrium allocation when the constraint is bind-
ing. This is because, apart from the initial old, every subsequent generation may be
worse off.
Finally, let us consider the special case of no altruism. Without altruism, parents
do not value their children’s consumption and hence the transfer constraint is always
binding. As long as the legal constraint b is not at the feasible minimum, this means
that such an equilibrium is not A-efﬁcient. The logic is the same as in the proof of
Proposition 2. The logic breaks down if the legal constraint coincides with the feasible
minimum, b = ¡1. For this special case, the equilibrium is both A-efﬁcient and the
constraint is binding. Note, however, that such an equilibrium is very strange: the
initial old expropriate all income from their children, who consequently consume zero,
and no children are born. Clearly, the only stationary equilibrium for this case is trivial:
no one is alive. We summarize these results in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume ³ = 0. Then the transfer constraint is always binding. There are two
cases:
a) if b > ¡1, then the equilibrium is A- (and P-) inefﬁcient.
b) if b = ¡1, then the equilibrium is such that cm
t = co
t+1 = nt¡1 = 0 for all t ¸ 1, and the
equilibrium is A- (and P¡) efﬁcient.
4.2 Property Rights vs. Altruism
Our set-up differs from the basic OLG literature along two dimensions: parents are
altruistic and fertility is endogenous. Table 1 classiﬁes the previous literature along
these two dimensions. We ﬁnd that differences in results in the previous literature are
mainly due to (implicit) assumptions about property rights, rather than to the presence
(or absence) of altruism, as is often stated.
The potential for dynamic inefﬁciencies in OLG models has long been recognized,
going back to Samuelson (1958). Several papers have added altruism to OLG models
with exogenous fertility (e.g., Barro (1974)). A result is that an OLG economy with
altruism behaves like an inﬁnitely lived agent economy and hence dynamic inefﬁcien-
cies disappear. For example, Burbidge (1983) showed that when altruism is properly
added to the standard OLG model, then the interest rate will always be larger than the
population growth rate, and hence the equilibrium allocation will always be Pareto ef-
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ﬁcient.22 This result is derived in the endogenous fertility context by Pazner and Razin
(1980), who also ﬁnd that equilibrium allocations are always dynamically efﬁcient in
the sense that r > n.23
Our Proposition 2 shows that altruism is perfectly consistent with inefﬁciencies oc-
curring in equilibrium. In other words, it is not the presence or absence of altruism
alone that is the dividing line between equilibrium efﬁciency and inefﬁciency. Rather,
inefﬁciencies occur precisely when the transfer constraint is binding, i.e., when par-
ents have too few property rights relative to their degree of altruism. Previous results
implicitly relied on the assumption that transfer constraints are not binding. More
speciﬁcally, the equivalence between an OLG model with altruism and an inﬁnitely
lived consumer model, as pointed out by Barro (1974), holds only if resources can be
transferred freely across generations—at least intra-temporally. However, this means
that parents are allowed to take as much as they want from their children.24 There are
several reasons why models with altruism typically abstract from transfer constraints.
First, models without constraints are easier to analyze. Second, once altruism is in-
troduced it might appear natural to let a dynastic head make all the decisions for the
dynasty. However, another natural benchmark is that children have full rights to their
22For example, in Burbidge (1983)’s setting, r > ¹ n always holds. His setting has no fertility choice (i.e.,
° = µ = 0). Altruism is added by deﬁning the intergenerational discount factor as ³ = ¹ n=(1 + ½) < 1,
where ½ is the intergenerational rate of time preference, ¹ n the exogenously given population growth rate.
It then follows that r = (1 + ½) in equilibrium and, since ³ < 1, the result follows. There was a heated
debate about these issues at the end of the 1970’s and early 1980’s. See for example, Drazen (1978),
Carmichael (1982), Buiter and Carmichael (1984), Burbidge (1984), Abel (1987) and Laitner (1988).
23Pazner and Razin (1980) is the only previous paper that has used the expression “property rights”
in this context. However, they analyze only the case where parents have full property rights.
24The usual interpretation is that parents and children share the same preferences whenever they are
alive. Hence children would willingly make these transfers. Such a speciﬁcation is isomorphic to ours
where parents have all property rights and transfer constraints are not binding.
21own (labor) endowments. In this case, inefﬁciencies may well occur in equilibrium,
even in models with altruism. Note that the result that full parental rights are sufﬁcient
to guarantee efﬁciency is a very general one. It holds independent of whether altruism
is assumed, and also independent of whether fertility is exogenous or endogenous.
Recently, several authors have analyzed OLG models with endogenous fertility,
but without altruism. This literature has pointed out that once fertility is endogenous,
standard results in the OLG literature fail to hold. In particular, Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez,
and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) and Michel and Wigniolle (2007, forthcoming) give examples
of economies where equilibria are not M-efﬁcient. Again, it is often pointed out that
the inefﬁciency can be attributed to the absence of altruism.25 However, our Proposi-
tion 3 shows that the crucial assumption that leads to equilibrium A-inefﬁciency is not
the lack of altruism, but rather the assignment of property rights to children. In fact,
essentially all models without altruism assume that children have full property rights
over themselves. This assumption is natural in this context. In models with exogenous
fertility and no altruism, parent-child relationships are not even clearly deﬁned and
hence the natural starting point is self-ownership for each agent in the economy. Once
fertility choice is added there are well-deﬁned family relationships. However, as long
as altruism is absent, parents will always take everything they legally or feasibly can
from their children. Thus, as shown in Proposition 3, case (b), not imposing any trans-
fer constraints implies that only parents consume anything, children starve and the
economy ends thereafter—not a very interesting case. Hence, such models typically
assume b = 0.
4.3 Necessary and Sufﬁcient Conditions for Efﬁciency
We now derive necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for efﬁciency. Figure 1 shows a
stylized description of how steady state interest and fertility rates change as a function
of b. The picture shows three distinct cases. When b is low, the constraint is not binding
(case 1). Second, when the constraint starts to bind, the interest rate is still above the
population growth rate at ﬁrst (case 2). The dividing line between cases 1 and 2 is
simply the equilibrium transfer chosen when the constraint is not binding, b¤. As b
increases further, at some point the interest and fertility rates cross. Thus, our third
case consists of all b where the interest rate is below population growth (case 3). The
dividing line is bP, deﬁned to be the constraint for which in equilibrium n = r. This
25For example, Cigno and Werding (2007) point to this dichotomy (p.121 and p.125).
22threshold relates our results to the OLG literature with exogenous fertility. Further,
to relate our results to the literature on efﬁciency in OLG models with endogenous
fertility, we use a third threshold, bM, to be such that in equilibrium w = µr. This
threshold typically lies within case 2. We explain below what assumptions guarantee
the existence of these cut-offs. In fact, for the Cobb-Douglas case, closed form solutions
for b¤, bP and bM exist (see Section 3.3).
























4.3.1 Case 1 [b < b¤]
Forlowenough minimumtransfers fromparentstochildren, theconstraint isnot bind-
ing. This is because with altruism, parents want their children to consume something.
In this case, equilibria are A-efﬁcient. This is the result in Proposition 1.
We know from Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) that A-efﬁciency implies Pareto-
efﬁciency (when fertility is held constant), hence dynamic efﬁciency is guaranteed in
23this case. Therefore the allocation in case 1 is also Pareto efﬁcient. In standard OLG
models(ﬁrstdevelopedbySamuelson(1958)andDiamond(1965)), thestationaryequi-
librium allocation is dynamically efﬁcient if and only if r > n (e.g., Cass (1972) and
Balasko and Shell (1980)). The analogous condition in our set-up is different.
Proposition 4 A stationary equilibrium allocation is A- (and P-)efﬁcient if and only if
n = ³r
Proof. This result follows directly from equations (8) and (9), together with Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 that state that the equilibrium is inefﬁcient if and only if the constraint
is binding.
Recall that ³ < 1 is necessary for the model to be well-deﬁned. Thus, Proposition 4
immediatelyimpliesthatanyA-efﬁcientallocationischaracterizedbyr > n. However,
as we will see in case 2, the condition is not sufﬁcient here.
4.3.2 Case 2 [b 2 (b¤;bP)]
As soon as b > b¤, the constraint binds. Once the constraint binds, the equilibrium
allocation is A-inefﬁcient as Proposition 2 showed.
Note that case 2 is still characterized by r > n. Hence, an immediate implication is
that, in contrast to models with exogenous fertility, r > n is not a sufﬁcient condition
for A-efﬁciency. The reason is that over-saving is not the only potential problem in this
economy. Instead, child-bearing may be too low in equilibrium. We summarize these
insights as a proposition.
Proposition 5 In a stationary equilibrium, r > n is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition
for A-efﬁciency.
Proof. Necessity follows from Proposition 4 and condition (4). To show that it is not
sufﬁcient, realize that for b = b¤ we have r > n by Proposition 4. By continuity, there
exists b > b¤ such that r > n. This together with Proposition 2 proves the result.
Thus for any b 2 (b¤;bP), the equilibrium allocation is A-inefﬁcient but Pareto ef-
ﬁcient. The result that r > n is not a sufﬁcient condition for A-efﬁciency may have
important implications. Sometimes the r > n criterion is used to assess whether a par-
ticular country is dynamically efﬁcient (e.g., Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser
24(1989)). This can be relevant in the context of designing social security systems, for
example. Our ﬁndings suggest that such analysis may have been based on the wrong
criterion—given that, in the developed world at least, by and large people do choose
their own birth rate.
Several authors have analyzed models with endogenous fertility but without altru-
ism (see Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) and Michel and Wigniolle
(2007, forthcoming)). Proposition 3 shows that interior equilibria can never be A-
efﬁcient when parents are not altruistic. The reason is that without altruism (in our
model: ³ = 0), any transfer constraint binds since parents optimally extract the maxi-
mum feasible amount from their children. Papers without altruism therefore typically
use a different efﬁciency concept: M-efﬁciency, which is similar to A-efﬁciency but
requires people within a generation to be treated symmetrically. Generally speaking
more allocations are M-efﬁcient than A-efﬁcient, because fewer allocations are consid-
ered for potential domination. In particular, only allocations that treat everyone in a
given generation identically are considered, whereas in our proof of A—inefﬁciency,
we constructed a superior allocation that treated new people differently from those
who are alive under both allocations.
These authors also ﬁnd that r > n is not sufﬁcient for M-efﬁciency. Instead, they
ﬁnd that a sufﬁcient condition for M-efﬁciency is given by rµ > w (see Conde-Ruiz,
Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010), Proposition 5 and Corollary 2, and Michel and
Wigniolle (2007), Proposition 4). Again, we ﬁnd that rµ ¸ w is necessary, but not
sufﬁcient for A-efﬁciency. In fact, for many utility speciﬁcations an even stronger re-
sult is true: A-efﬁciency implies that rµ > w holds with strict inequality. See Appendix
A.2 for details.
Proposition 6 In a stationary equilibrium, rµ ¸ w is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition
for A-efﬁciency.
Proof. Necessity is shown by way of contradiction. Assume z¤ is an interior A-efﬁcient
stationary equilibrium allocation for which rµ < w holds. From Propositions 1 and 2
we know that z¤ is the solution to the problem when the constraint is not binding. Note



















> 0. By choos-
25ing this transfer, it is affordable to produce an arbitrarily large amount of children.
Since children would be left with an endowment of wt+1(1 + bt+1) > 0, their utility
would be ﬁnite, while the utility from number of children would be inﬁnite. Hence the
utility of generation t would be inﬁnite and z¤ cannot be optimal. This is a contradic-
tion. It proves that rµ ¸ w is a necessary condition for A-efﬁciency. To show that the
condition is not sufﬁcient, we provide a counterexample. Suppose b = 0, production is
Cobb-Douglas and utility is logarithmic. Then the constraint is binding if and only if
¯(1 ¡ ®) > ®³(1 + ¯ + °):
Using the functional form assumptions, ^ w < µ^ r reduces to ¯(1 ¡ ®) < ®°=µ: Choosing
® small enough guarantees that the ﬁrst inequality holds. Then, one can choose µ small
enough to guarantee that the second inequality holds. Thus, we constructed an exam-
ple where the constraint is binding and by Proposition 2 the allocation is inefﬁcient,
yet, w < µr.
The proposition implies that for b¤ between b¤ and bM) (i.e., case 2a) the equilibrium
allocation is A-inefﬁcient but M-efﬁcient. If capital and labor are substitutable enough
in production, we have shown in Section 3.4 that w increases in b, while r decreases.
Hence, as b increases further, w > µr. It seems plausible therefore that a range of b
exists within (bM;bP) where equilibrium allocation are M-inefﬁcient but still Pareto ef-
ﬁcient (case 2b). Michel and Wigniolle (2007, forthcoming) implicitly assume b = 0 but
derive interesting results in this context. Proposition 3 in Michel and Wigniolle (forth-
coming) implies that with a logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production function,
equilibria are M-efﬁcient if and only if they are Pareto efﬁcient (see also Remark 5 in
Michel and Wigniolle (2007)). Further, they show that a more general production func-
tion with an elasticity of substitution greater than one may indeed lead to equilibrium
allocations that are Pareto efﬁcient, but M-inefﬁcient (see Proposition 3 in Michel and
Wigniolle (2007)). Such an equilibrium is also A-inefﬁcient. While the dominating
allocation (with unequal treatment) used in the proof of Proposition 2 still works, in
this case, one can also ﬁnd dominating allocations that do not involve asymmetries
between people within the same generation.
264.3.3 Case 3 [b 2 (bP;b
max)]
In this case r < n, and hence the equilibrium is A-, M- and Pareto-inefﬁcient. In this
case people are saving too much, and a dominating allocation can be constructed by
redistributing resources across generations (holding population size ﬁxed).
Does this case always exist? Not necessarily. Depending on functional forms and
parameters, this Pareto-inefﬁcient case may never be reached. The reason is that there
is a maximally feasible level of b. Once a parent is required to transfer resources to the
child that exceed the income of the parent, the economy is no longer well-deﬁned. The
question thus becomes whether the interest rate becomes smaller than the fertility rate
before this maximal level is reached, or not. For the Cobb-Douglas case, closed form
solutions for bP and b
max exist (see Section 3.3). The following proposition follows
immediately.
Proposition 7 With Cobb-Douglas production and log utility, Pareto inefﬁciency occurs for
high enough b if and only if ® < 1
1+2¯+° .
Thus, models with endogenous fertility and altruism can be inefﬁcient in the usual
sense, i.e., dynamically inefﬁcient, as long as the capital share is low and people care
enough about old age consumption (high ¯) and the number of children (high °). If
the capital share is high relative to these utility parameters, then accumulating capital
is productive enough so that over-accumulation does not occur.
5 Policy Implications
Given the equilibrium inefﬁciencies resulting from binding transfer constraints, the
most obvious policy recommendation would be to simply lift the constraints and give
parents full property rights over their children. However, such a policy might not be
desirable for various reasons. For example, some parents may abuse their children.
Further, there will always be some people who simply cannot have children for med-
ical reasons. Most importantly, it might be very difﬁcult to enforce payments from
adult children to their parents. While all these additional concerns are outside of our
model, we believe it useful to explore to what extent alternative policies can also im-
plement efﬁcient allocations in equilibrium.
For example, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system essentially provides a way
of transferring resources from the young to the old. Hence, a PAYG system may be
27desirable in societies where children have rights over their labor income. On the other
hand, it may further distort the incentives to have children. In addition to a standard
PAYG system, we also examine a fertility dependent PAYG pension system as well
as fertility subsidies ﬁnanced with government debt. In each case, we ask whether a
given policy allows the implementation of A-efﬁcient allocations.
5.1 PAYG social security
We introduce a pay-as-you-go social security system (PAYG) in the model laid out in
Section 3. First, we show that the introduction of a standard PAYG social security
system, in which children are taxed to ﬁnance lump-sum transfers to parents when
old, alleviates the downward pressure on fertility and increases the desired transfer
when parents are constrained. Second, we show that the standard PAYG system cannot
be used to implement an A¡efﬁcient allocation. The intuition for this result is that,
while taxes that ﬁnance pension payments may be lump-sum to children, they are
distortionary to the parent’s fertility decision.
The government taxes middle aged people at rate ¿t and gives the proceeds as a
lump-sum pension, Tt, to the old. Both the children and parents take these taxes and
pensions as given. Hence, the modiﬁed budget constraints are:
c
m
t + µtnt + st+1 · wt(1 + bt ¡ ¿t) (32)
c
o
t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt · rt+1st+1 + Tt+1 (33)
To simplify algebra, we specify taxes proportional to wages. Note, however, that labor
is supplied inelastically, and therefore our speciﬁcation, is equivalent to lump-sum
taxes for generation t.
A PAYG system requires the government to balance its budget every period. Hence,
we have Tt+1 = nt¿t+1wt+1. That is, the government chooses one instrument, say ¿t+1,
while the other, Tt+1, is determined in equilibrium, by the fertility choice of all parents.
The (inﬁnitesimal) individual parent realizes that his/her fertility choice alone will not
affect the average pension and hence takes Tt+1 as given. Otherwise, everything in
this set-up is the same as before. In particular, other than the budget constraints none
of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household or the ﬁrm and none of the feasibility
conditions are affected by this change.
First, assume that b is high enough so that the transfer constraint is binding. Us-
28ing the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (16), the budget constraint when old, capital
market clearing and the government’s budget balance, one can derive the analog of








The only difference from equation (18) is the term °¿s+1. Again, assume that capital
and labor are substitutable enough, then the capital-labor ratio is decreasing in ¿s+1
(see Appendix A.3 for details). Using this, one can derive the analog of equation (30):
^ ns =
°(ws(1 + bs ¡ ¿s))




Comparative statics with respect to ¿ are very similar to those in Section 3.4. We con-
centrate here on the direct effect of an increase in ¿. Speciﬁcally, assume ¿s+1 increases,
but ¿s stays the same. Thus, generation s’s tax contribution is not affected, but gener-
ation s knows that they will receive higher pensions when old. By construction, this
change does not affect the capital labor ratio in period s and therefore ws is also con-
stant. Since
d^ ks+1
d¿s+1 < 0 so that
ws+1
rs+1 unambiguously decreases, it follows that d^ ns
d¿s+1 > 0.
Thus, if generation s is initially transfer constrained, the introduction of a standard
PAYG social security system increases fertility. The reason is a simple income effect
from increased pension income. 26
An increase in ¿ also eventually relaxes the transfer constraint. To see this, recall








Using the budget constraints in equations (32) and (33), the introduction of a PAYG
pension system clearly tends to increase the RHS and decrease the LHS of this inequal-
ity. Thus, for a large enough tax system the transfer constraint is no longer binding. For
example, if ¿t+1 = wt+1(1 + bt+1), the parent would like to make a transfer bt+1 > bt+1
so that the children’s consumption is positive.
Even though transfers can become operative if the PAYG tax is large enough (i.e.,
26Subsequent generations also experience a negative income effect because their tax burden increases
and wages decrease (see the numerator of equation (35)). Hence their fertility may increase or decrease.
See also Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005) for quantitative analyses
of the effects of PAYG social security on fertility in models with endogenous fertility.
29the constraint may become irrelevant), the resulting equilibrium is nevertheless not





t+1 + µtnt+1 + st+2 ¡ wt+1 + ¿t+1wt+1) · rt+1st+1 + Tt+1
It is immediately apparent that the “lump-sum” tax on children, ¿t+1, is distor-
tionary to the parent: the more children he/she has, the more taxes his/her dynasty
pays. That is, parents do not internalize that children are future contributors to the
social security system, Tt+1, and therefore do not produce the efﬁcient number of chil-
dren.27
This result is in contrast with the exogenous fertility dynastic OLG literature, start-
ing with Barro (1974) and followed by Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983), Abel (1987)
and others, where operative bequests or transfers are a sufﬁcient condition for opti-
mality or Pareto efﬁciency. The basic problem with a standard PAYG system is that the
costs and beneﬁts of producing children remain unaligned.
5.2 Fertility dependent PAYG pensions
The obvious way to align the cost and beneﬁts of having children is to make the
pension system fertility dependent (FDPAYG), the focus of this section.28 We show
how such a system, like standard PAYG, alleviates the downward pressure on fertil-
ity caused by binding property rights. Since parents are altruistic in our setup, FD-
PAYG also generates an increase in the desired transfer. If the FDPAYG system is large
enough, the allocation of consumption levels is the same as in the case where parents
have full property rights. Thus FDPAYG can be used to implement an A-efﬁcient al-
location. Interestingly, in the spirit of this result, several countries have now made
provisions for time spent raising children to count towards pension entitlements. In
France, for example, a child supplement of 10% is added to social security beneﬁts if
the person raised at least three children.29
As before, the government taxes the middle aged at rate ¿t and gives the proceeds
27See Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005), p. 40, for a similar point.
28Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot (2004), Lang (2005) and Conde-Ruiz,
Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) also point out that a fertility-dependent social security system is
optimal. In contrast to our analysis, their results are derived in a model without altruism. Moreover, as
mentioned before, the optimality concepts used differ from ours. Finally, property rights are assumed
to lie with children throughout their analysis.
29Many other European countries have similar provisions, see Social Security Administration (2004).
30as a fertility dependent pension, Tt(nt¡1), to the old. That is, the parent knows that an




t + µtnt + st+1 · wt(1 + bt ¡ ¿t)
c
o
t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt · rt+1st+1 + Tt+1(nt)
Again, a PAYG system requires that the government balances its budget:
Tt+1(nt) = nt¿t+1wt+1.
For the household, this change alters the ﬁrst-order condition for fertility, nt. As-
suming pensions are linear functions of fertility so that T 0






t+1)[FK(kt+1;1)µt + (bt+1 ¡ ¿t+1)FN(kt+1;1)]: (36)
Assume that b is high enough, so that, given ¿, the transfer constraint is binding.
Using the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (15), the budget constraints for the house-
hold and the government’s budget balance, one can derive the analog of equation (18)








This equation is very similar to (34). Note, however, that now b and ¿ enter in exactly
the same way. Therefore, simply by setting ¿ = b, we can mimic a world without
transfer constraints and without a pension system.
One can also derive the analog of equation (30) for ¿s+1 > 0:
^ ns =
¯ + °
1 + ¯ + °
µ
^ ws(1 + bs ¡ ¿s)
µs + ^ ks+1
¶
(38)
Again, we consider the simple case where ¿t changes for all t starting at t ¸ s+1 and is
unchanged prior to that. This means that ^ ws, bs and ¿s are all ﬁxed. Assuming that cap-
ital and labor are substitutable enough, it follows that d^ ns





(see Appendix A.3 for details). Thus, if generation s is constrained, the introduction
of a fertility dependent PAYG social security system leads to an increase in fertility. It
also relaxes the transfer constraint in a way similar to the standard PAYG. Contrary to
31the standard PAYG system however, a large enough FDPAYG system implements an
A¡efﬁcient allocation, because by choosing a large enough ¿ the government can undo
the effect of the binding transfer constraint. Rather than parents taking from their own
children, the government taxes all children and then allocates funds to the old taking
the number of children into account.
Finally, note that if the policy goal is to implement this particular A¡efﬁcient al-
location (i.e., the one that coincides with the equilibrium allocation in a world where
parents have full property rights), there is no unique “optimal tax”, but an entire range
of large enough FDPAYG taxes that implement the same A¡efﬁcient allocation. If ¿ is
set larger than bw, parents will simply undo the “too large” pension payment by giv-
ing transfers back to their own children. Note that this result is different from Eckstein
and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot (2004), Lang (2005) and Conde-Ruiz,
Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) who all ﬁnd a unique optimal fertility dependent
tax level in related contexts but without altruism.30
This result speaks to the current policy debate that blames low fertility rates for the
insolvency of the standard PAYG systems around the western world. While a social
security system may have seemed the obvious solution to old age poverty in a world
where children were no longer obliged to look after their parents, it created inefﬁcient
distortions of fertility decisions.
5.3 Fertility subsidies and government debt
Another pronatalist policy that is seen to varying degrees in many countries are fer-
tility subsidies. For example, many countries have tax deductions for children. Some
countries also give a one-time subsidy for the birth of each child. For example, the
Russian government pays 4,500 Rubles for the birth of each child. Similarly, several
cantons in Switzerland and some cities in Italy pay large birth grants.31 We now show
that in the context of our model, fertility subsidies make sense. They give an incentive
to increase child-bearing and, if set at a high enough level, can lead to efﬁcient fertility
choices. In particular, we show that the unconstrained equilibrium allocation can be
implemented through a policy that subsidizes fertility and ﬁnances these subsidies by
issuing debt. The debt is then repaid by taxing the next generation, i.e., the children, in
30It is important to note that the allocation resulting from a large enough FDPAYG system is not the
only efﬁcient allocation. It is also not A¡superior to the allocation where parents are constrained and
taxes are zero because, except for the initial old, every subsequent generation may be worse off.
31See Social Security Administration (2004) for details of such policies in European countries.
32a lump-sum fashion a period later.
Let ¿s
t be the per child subsidy a parent receives and ¿d
t a labor income tax rate on
all young people. Let dt+1 be per middle-aged person debt issued by the government.
c
m
t + µtnt + st+1 + dt+1 · wt(1 + bt ¡ ¿
d





t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt · rt+1(st+1 + dt+1)
Government budget balance (per old person) requires that
nt¡1(dt+1 + ¿
d
t wt) = rtdt + ¿
s
t ntnt¡1
holds in all periods.
Now suppose the government sets ¿d
t = ¿t and ¿s
t = ¿t+1
wt+1
rt+1 where ¿t are the taxes
speciﬁed for the FDPAYG pension above. It is straightforward to see that the house-
hold’s budget set in period t is the same as for the FDPAYG pension. Further, if the
government issues debt dt+1 = ¿s
t nt, then the government budget constraint holds
every period. Therefore, for large enough fertility subsidies, the A-efﬁcient allocation
can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome.
In sum, fertility subsidies together with taxes on the next generation to ﬁnance the
these subsidies is identical, in our model, to allowing parents to leave negative be-
quests to their own children. In a more complicated model the two policies might not
be exactly identical. In fact, fertility subsidies might be more desirable. For example
in a world with uncertainty about the type (e.g., labor productivity) of one’s own chil-
dren, a fertility subsidy effectively offers insurance against low quality children. Such
insurance is not offered by simply allowing parents to tap into their own children’s
income.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effects of various degrees of parental control over chil-
dren’s labor income. We start by documenting that in most developed countries, laws
implemented in the last two centuries effectively reallocated property rights from par-
ents to children. First we characterize equilibria in an OLG model with endogenous
fertility where parents are altruistic towards children. We show that when children
own themselves, the costs and beneﬁts of having children are not aligned, which can
33lead to inefﬁciently low fertility. Furthermore, we show that property rights are rele-
vant in reconciling results from models with and without altruism, and with and with-
out endogenous fertility. We also show how property rights over children interact with
other intergenerational policies. We show that a standard PAYG system will not lead
to an A-efﬁcient allocation because even though taxes when middle-aged are lump-
sum to children, they are distortionary from the parent’s point of view. We therefore
examine alternative pension systems, in particular one where pension payments are a
function of fertility choices, as well as fertility subsidies and government debt. Both
systems are able to implement an A-efﬁcient allocation. These policies might be prob-
lematic, of course, when fertility has a stochastic component. In this case, the system
may need to make provisions for involuntary infertility.
The focus of our work so far is on the theoretical properties of fertility models and
the characterization of equilibria with and without parental control rights. Alongside
the theory, the ideas presented here may have something to say about the historical
fertility experience in the United States. A combination of shifts in property rights
and the introduction of PAYG social security may help account for fertility patterns
over the past two centuries, including the baby boom and bust. This combination
may also have generated Caldwell (1978)’s reversal of net transfers between parents
and children. That is, a combination of laws (restrictions on transfers together with
a social security system) lead from a situation where transfers run from children to
parents, to a world where transfers run from parents to children. Whether this channel
indeed played a quantitatively important role in U.S. fertility history will be analyzed
in future research.
The set-up could be easily extended to analyze many other interesting applications.
For example, constraints on transfers are likely to be binding only for some families.
Introducing heterogeneity and analyzing the impact of legal changes on differential
fertility would be very interesting. Some authors such as De la Croix and Doepke
(2003, 2004, 2009), Doepke (2004) and Zhao (2009) have used ability or “skill” hetero-
geneity to generate differential fertility. Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2008) give
examples of preference heterogeneity. Drazen (1978), Laitner (1979) and Cukierman
and Meltzer (1989) determine which types of households are likely to be bequest-
constrained in models with exogenous fertility. The analysis of differential fertility
and property rights would require us to derive similar comparative statics in models
with endogenous fertility.
Also, it might be fruitful to explicitly model the distinction between transfers from
34minor vs. adult children to parents. For example, child labor laws were concerned
with minor children, while the English poor laws were concerned with adult children.
Introducing this distinction into the theoretical set-up may shed further light on the
importance of such laws. Interactions between fertility and educational choice may
also be interesting in this context.
Finally, since labor supply is essentially inelastic in our setup and all agents are
identical, it does not matter whether taxes are lump-sum or proportional to wages.
In a setting with a labor-leisure choice, human capital investments, heterogeneity or
even private information,32 this equivalence no longer holds. Extending our analysis
to models with elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes is left for future research.
In this paper, we take the shift in property rights as given and explore its conse-
quences. Yet, a big open question is why laws shifting property rights from parents to
children were introduced. At least two potential answers come to mind. One would be
that legal constraints shifted for political economy reasons (e.g., that a majority of peo-
ple voted for children’s rights due to increased longevity, for example). Alternatively,
the reason behind changes in de-facto ownership may have been driven by technolog-
ical changes. For example, the change from an agricultural rural society to an indus-
trialized urban society may have brought a change in the de facto control parents have
over their children. We leave this investigation to future research.
32see Hosseini, Jones, and Shourideh (2009) for example
35A Appendix
A.1 Formal deﬁnitions of Efﬁciency
Here we formally deﬁne the four notions of efﬁciency that we use throughout the pa-
per. We begin with the usual notion of Pareto efﬁciency for completeness. Key here
is that population size is ﬁxed in any potentially dominating allocation. To deal with
endogenous fertility, Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) suggest two generalizations of
Pareto efﬁciency that allow for changing sets of people when comparing alternative
allocations: A- and P-Efﬁciency. We also deﬁne Millian efﬁciency, a concept used in
several other papers. This concept is similar to A- efﬁciency, but differs in that it re-
quires potentially dominating allocations to be symmetric within generations.




paper we also assume that ui(unborn) < ui(z) for all z in which i is born.
Deﬁnition 8 A feasible allocation z = fzigi is Pareto efﬁcient if there is no other feasible
allocation ^ z with the same set of people alive such that
1. ui(^ z) ¸ ui(z) 8i.
2. ui(^ z) > ui(z) for some i.
Let P be the set of potential people. An allocation z = fzigi2P speciﬁes zi the vec-
tor of all the goods over which i’s utility is deﬁned. Let A be the set of all possible
allocations. Further, let A(i) be the set of all allocations in which i is born.
To deﬁne A¡efﬁciency, the following assumption is needed:
Assumption 9 For each i 2 P, there is a well deﬁned, real-valued utility function
ui : A(i) ! R.
Deﬁnition 10 A feasible allocation z = fzigi is A-efﬁcient if there is no other feasible alloca-
tion ^ z such that
1. ui(^ z) ¸ ui(z) 8i alive in both allocations.
2. ui(^ z) > ui(z) for some i alive in both allocations.
To deﬁne P¡efﬁciency, the following assumption is needed:
36Assumption 11 For each i 2 P, there is a well deﬁned, real-valued utility function
ui : A ! R.
Deﬁnition 12 A feasible allocation z = fzigi is P-efﬁcient if there is no other feasible alloca-
tion ^ z such that
1. ui(^ z) ¸ ui(z) for all i 2 P
2. ui(^ z) > ui(z)) for at least one i 2 P.
Deﬁnition 13 A feasible allocation z = fzigi is M-efﬁcient if there is no other feasible alloca-
tion ^ z such that
1. ui(^ z) ¸ ui(z) 8i alive in both allocations.
2. ui(^ z) > ui(z) for some i alive in both allocations.
3. ut
i(^ z) = ut
j(^ z) 8i;j alive in both allocations, where t indexes the generation.
A.2 Non-separable preferences and the logarithmic special case
Suppose that, instead of separable preferences as considered in the main text, prefer-
ences are of the Barro-Becker type and given by
Ut = u(c
m
t ) + ¯u(c
o
t+1) + ³g(nt)Ut+1
Assume that and u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ and g(n) = n1¡". Then, following Jones and Schoonbroodt
(forthcoming), there are three sets of parameter restrictions that ensure that utility sat-
isﬁes the usual monotonicity and concavity properties:
AI. [0 < " < ¾ < 1]. In this case, number and utility of children are complements
in the utility of the parent and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption (IES) is larger than one.
AII. [1 < ¾ < "]. In this case, number and utility of children are substitutes in the
utility of the parent and the IES is smaller than one.
AIII. [1 ¡ " = ±(1 ¡ ¾) with ± > 1 and ¾ ! 1]. In this case, utility is separable and
logarithmic.33 This case is identical to our formulation (5) with logarithmic utility
33Details on the necessary utility transformations that lead to this result are available upon request.
37when ° ´
±³(1+¯)
1¡³ . Since ± > 1, it follows immediately that ° <
³(1+¯)
1¡³ , which is
our condition (3).
It follows that a general separable utility formulation is not a special case of the
Barro-Becker preferences, except for the logarithmic case. This limits the scope and
ease of direct comparisons with results in non-altruistic models with endogenous fer-
tility. Because of this, we chose a general separable utility formulation as our main
speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, with minor restrictions on the additional parameters, sim-
ilar results to those derived in Section 4 go through also with the non-separable Barro-
Becker preferences. In particular:
² Propositions 1 and 2 remain identical.
² Similar to Proposition 4, a stationary equilibrium allocation is A- (and P-)efﬁcient
if and only if n" = ³r.
² Similarto Proposition5, itfollows thatif "islargeenough, then r > n isnecessary
for A-efﬁciency. In particular, " ¸ 1 is large enough, which is guaranteed in cases
AII. and AIII. That r > n is not sufﬁcient still follows by continuity.
² Regarding Proposition 6, a stronger result holds, namely µr > w (with strict in-
equality) is necessary for A-efﬁciency.34 Indeed, consumption when middle aged


















> 0 under any parameter conﬁguration, µr¤ > w¤ must hold at an in-
terior unconstrained equilibrium and necessity for A-efﬁciency follows as before.
That µr > w is not sufﬁcient follows by continuity.
In sum, if number and utility of children are not too complementary in the utility of
the parent, or equivalently, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough,
all our results go through. This restriction is not very stringent. In particular, standard
values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the growth and business cycle
literature, as well as in the recent fertility literature, fall within this range.
34Note that we rule out the case where ¾ = " in all three parameter conﬁgurations. In this case,
only aggregate consumption enters the Planner’s utility and population becomes a standard investment
good. The arbitrage condition holds with equality, µr = w. See Jones and Schoonbroodt (forthcoming)
for details.
38A.3 Comparative statics of the capital-labor ratio
Suppose F(Kt;Lt) = A[®K
½




½. In this case, we have
wt = FL(kt;1) = A(1 ¡ ®)[®k
½
t + (1 ¡ ®)]
1¡½
½
rt = FK(kt;1) = A®
£











where kt ´ Kt
















Since ½ < 1, the LHS of this equation is always decreasing in ^ kt+1. The RHS is
² increasing in ^ kt+1 if ½ > 0 (substitutes case);
² independent of ^ kt+1 if ½ = 0 (the Cobb-Douglas Case);
² decreasing in ^ kt+1 if ½ < 0 (complements case).
Now, an increase in bt+1 shifts the LHS up. As long as the RHS is either weakly increas-
ing (½ ¸ 0) or decreasing but less steep than the LHS (°½^ kt+1 > ¡¯µt(1 ¡ ½)), we have
d^ kt+1
















dbt+1 > 0 if and only if
°½^ kt+1 > ¡¯µt(1 ¡ ½): (39)




































d¿t+1 < 0 if and only if condition (39) holds. This implies that in both cases
dwt+1
d¿t+1 > 0 and
drt+1
d¿t+1 < 0.
39A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the following alternative allocation. Generation s is allocated the
following consumption, savings and number of children:
~ c
m
s = ^ c
m
s ¡ µs" ~ ns = ^ ns + "
~ c
o
s+1 = ^ c
o
s+1 + (± ¡¹ bs+1 ^ ws+1)" ~ ss+1 = ^ ss+1:




F(^ ss+1; ~ ns) ¡ F(^ ss+1; ^ ns)
"
¡ ^ ss+2 ¡ µs+1^ ns+1 +¹ b ¡ ±
~ c
o
n = ^ c
o
s+2 ~ nn = ^ ns+1 ~ sn = ^ ss+2
That is, we are giving the newborns an equal fraction of the extra output they produce
and take ± ¡ ¹ bs+1 ^ ws+1 away from each child when middle-aged to give to the parent
whenoldinperiods+1—thatis, theygive± moretotheirparentsthandotheirsiblings.
They do, however, have the same fertility, savings, and consumption when old as their
siblings. While everyone else receives the same as in the hat equilibrium allocation.
That is 8t 6= s:
~ c
m
t = ^ c
m
t ~ nt = ^ nt
~ c
o
t+1 = ^ c
o
t+1 ~ st+1 = ^ st+1
Note that feasibility of the alternative allocation follows directly by construction.
Essentially the additional output that is produced by having more workers in period
s + 1 is divided equally among the additional children, minus the net transfer (± ¡
¹ bs+1 ^ ws+1)theygivetotheirparents. Wenowshowthat, forsmall"and±, thealternative
allocation is A-superior to the equilibrium allocation. To do this, deﬁne ~ Ut to be the
utility of generation t under the new allocation and ^ Ut under the equilibrium allocation
respectively. Then, it is easy to see that ~ Ut = ^ Ut for all t > s. Further, for the " mass of
new people, we have:
~ Un(";±) = ^ Us+1 ¡ u(^ c
m
s+1) + u(~ c
m
n )
40For generation s (i.e., the parents of the new children), we have:
~ Us(²;±) = u(~ c
m
s ) + ¯u(~ c
o
s+1) + °u(~ ns) + ³
Ã
^ ns ~ Us+1 + ²~ Un(²;±)
^ ns + ²
!
Using the construction of the tilde allocation, this is equal to
u(^ c
m
s ¡ µ²) + ¯u(^ c
o
s+1 + ²(± ¡¹ bs+1 ^ ws+1)) + °u(^ ns + ²) + ³
µ
²[u(~ cm
n ) ¡ u(^ cm
s+1)]
^ ns + ²
¶
+ ³ ^ Us+1









s ) + ¯u
0(^ c
o
s+1)[± ¡¹ bs+1 ^ ws+1] + °u
0(^ ns) + ³
[u(^ cm
s+1 ¡ ±) ¡ u(^ cm
s+1)]
^ ns









s+1 ¡ ±) ¡ u(^ c
m
s+1)]
Note that for ± = 0, this term is zero. So all that is left to show is that for a small



















Which is equal to
¸b
^ ws+1^ ns by equation 9, which is strictly positive if and only if the
constraint is binding. Hence, for small ² and ±, generation s is strictly better off with
the alternative allocation. Finally, any generation prior to s has generation s as a de-
scendant, and hence is also strictly better off. This completes the proof that the alter-
native allocation A-dominates the equilibrium allocation. If in addition we also have
u(FL( ^ K; ^ n) ¡ ^ s ¡ µ^ n + b) > u(unborn) then the new children are also strictly better off,
and hence the alternative allocation also P-dominates the equilibrium allocation.
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